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Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The policy behind the Federal Arbitration Act1 (FAA) is to ensure the
"rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements."12 However,
the ambiguity of the FAA's venue provisions for enforcement of arbitration
awards3 has resulted in disagreement about the appropriate scope of their
application, often delaying the award's enforcement. 4
It is evident under the FAA that the court where the award was granted
has jurisdiction over confirmation proceedings when parties do not provide
for a specific venue for enforcement of those awards. 5 The court where the
award was granted also has jurisdiction over vacation or modification
proceedings. 6 The jurisdictional issue arises, however, when the contractual
* 120 S.Ct. 1331 (2000).
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
2 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)
(stating that "Congress' clear intent, in the Arbitration Act, [is] to move the parties to an
arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.").
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
4 Appellate courts are divided on the issue of whether the FAA's venue provisions
should be permissive or restrictive. The following circuits interpreted the provisions
permissively: P & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1999)
(§§ 9 and 10 permissive); Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., Inc., 142 F.3d
188, 192 (4th Cir. 1998) (§ 9 permissive); In re VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F.3d 139, 144-45
(7th Cir. 1994) (§§ 9 and 10 permissive); Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 344
(8th Cir. 1990) (§ 9 permissive); Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 706
(2d Cir. 1985) (§ 9 permissive). Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1335. The following circuits
interpret the provisions restrictively: Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
Cent. Dist. of Cal., 872 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1989) (§§ 9 and 10 restrictive); Central
Valley Typographical Union No. 46 v. McClatchy Newspapers, 762 F.2d 741, 744 (9th
Cir. 1985) (§ 10 restrictive); Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046,
1049-50 (6th Cir. 1984) (§ 9 restrictive); United States ex rel. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v.
Ets-Hokin Corp., 397 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1968) (§ 10 restrictive). Id. at 1335.
If the venue provisions in the FAA are permissive, then motions to confirm, vacate,
or modify can be brought either in the jurisdiction where the award was rendered or in the
jurisdiction that is proper under the general venue statute. See id. at 1335-36. However, if
the venue provisions are restrictive then motions to confirm, vacate, or modify can only
be brought in the jurisdiction where the award was rendered. Id. at 1336.
5 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating that "[i]f no court is specified in the
agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in
and for the district within which such award was made.").
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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agreement provides for subsequent proceedings to occur in "any court having
jurisdiction thereof."'7 The FAA neither contains such language nor provides
guidance for such broad jurisdictional provisions in the legislative history.8
Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
Bill Harbert Construction Co. 9 to resolve the conflict between circuits and to
determine whether parties can "contractually agree to a venue as broad as
'any court of competent jurisdiction' or whether the parties must name each
and every specific court in which motions to confirm[, modify,] or vacate
may be heard." 10
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CORTEZ
Bill Harbert Construction Company ("Harbert") entered into a contract
with Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. ("Cortez") to construct a wood chip mill in
Brookhaven, Mississippi. 1 As part of the contract, the parties agreed to
submit to arbitration "[aIll claims or disputes between the Contractor and the
Owner arising out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach thereof."12 The
parties also agreed that the award by the arbitrator would be final; that the
judgment entered on the agreement to arbitrate could be in any court with the
proper jurisdiction; that the award could be "enforceable under [the]
applicable law in any court" with the proper jurisdiction; and "that the law of
[Mississippi,] the place where the project was located," would govern.13
Harbert submitted an application to the American Arbitration
Association when a dispute subsequently arose with Cortez.14 The arbitration
was conducted, and the award was issued in late 1997 in Birmingham,
Alabama. 15 In January 1998, Cortez sought to vacate, 16 modify, 17 or stay18
7 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1334.
8 Michael G. Schwartz & Amy Yip-Kikugawa, Note, Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc.
v. United States District Court: Restrictive Venue and Motions to Confirm or Vacate
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 629, 630 (1998).
9 Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 120 S.Ct. 1331 (2000).
10 Schwartz & Yip-Kikugawa, supra note 8, at 630; see supra note 4 and
accompanying text.





16 The venue specified for vacating arbitration awards is stated as follows: "[The
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an
410
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the Alabama arbitration award granted in favor of Harbert in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, where the
contract was performed. 19 Harbert filed a motion to confirm20 the award
seven days later in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama.21
A finding by the Alabama District Court that the FAA's venue
provisions were permissive, "thus supplement[ing] ... not supplant[ing] the
general provision" would have allowed the Alabama court to stay the
proceedings and give the appropriate deference to the "court of first filing." 22
Instead, the Alabama District Court rejected a permissive reading of the
provisions and denied the motion stating that "venue was proper only in the
Northern District of Alabama." 23 Harbert was awarded judgment "for
$274,256.90 plus interests and costs." 24
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court
affirmed the award in favor of Harbert. The Court held that it was bound by
pre-1981 Fifth Circuit precedent that the FAA's venue provisions to confirm,
order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration[.]" 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
17 The venue specified for modifying arbitration awards is stated as follows: "MIThe
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an
order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration[.]" 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).18 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
19 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1334. It was proper under the general venue statute because
"venue in a diversity action [is proper] in 'a judicial district in which a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated."' Id. at 1335 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2)
(1994 & Supp. 2000)).
20 The proper venue for confirmation of arbitration awards is as follows:.
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall
be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the
court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated,
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
21 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1334.
2 2 Id. at 1335-36.
23 Id. at 1334.
24Id.
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modify, or vacate awards were applicable exclusively in the district in which
the arbitration award was made, the Northern District of Alabama.25
I. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the proper
interpretation-permissive or restrictive-of the FAA's venue provisions
governing motions to confirm, vacate, or modify.26 In reversing the lower
courts' decisions, the Court found that a permissive, rather than restrictive,
interpretation was more appropriate in light of the legislative history of the
statute and the general policy behind the FAA, the conflict that a restrictive
interpretation may cause motions to stay proceedings, and the "anomalous" 27
impact of an alternatively restrictive interpretation on international
arbitration provisions.
Rejecting both parties' attempts to compare the statutory construction of
phrases appearing in other parts of the FAA, the Court held that statutory
history actually provided better insight into the proper interpretation. 28 At the
time the FAA was enacted, venue provisions would have allowed civil suits
to be brought "in the district in which the defendant resided" because of the
significantly more restrictive general venue statute.29 Moreover, restrictive
interpretations would have been more expected since courts generally
disliked forum selection clauses.30 Thus, an arbitration agreement that
25 Harbert Constr. Co. v. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., 169 F.3d 693, 694-95 (11th Cir.
1999).
26 Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 527 U.S. 1062 (1999). The
Court's opinion also applied to the provision governing motions to confirm arbitration
awards, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994 & Supp. 2000), even though it was not at issue at the District
Court proceeding. Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1336. The Court felt that all three venue
provisions governing motions to confirm, vacate, and modify are "best analyzed
together" because of their "contemporaneous enactment and the similarity of their
pertinent language." Id.
27 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1338.
28 Id. at 1336.
29 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 112(a) (1926)). Allowing suits to proceed in jurisdictions
outside of a party's residence were difficult because of the "restrictive views of personal
jurisdiction." Id. at 1336 n.2. The Court compares this notion with the holding in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945), which stated that a
corporation, similar to an individual, can be subject to suit in the jurisdiction as long as
minimum contacts are established. See id.
30 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1336 (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1972)). The Supreme Court recognized in Bremen that "[f]orum-selection
clauses have historically not been favored by American courts .... [Both] federal and
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provided for action in the jurisdiction where the arbitration was conducted
would have been futile.31
The FAA, on the other hand, provided for special venue provisions that
were uncharacteristic of prior courts' more conservative readings of the
general venue provisions. 32 In fact, the Court pointed out that there seemed
to be no indication by Congress to extend the limitations under the general
venue provisions to the venue provisions of the FAA particularly since
section 9 of the FAA allows for an agreement to confirm an arbitration award
either in a court specified by the parties or where the award was rendered.33
Further, the Court rejected Harbert's position that sections 10 and 11-the
modification and vacation provisions-should be read separately from
section 9.34
The Court also stated that a permissive interpretation of the FAA's venue
provisions is more consistent with an overall desire to have a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration."35 Allowing the parties to have flexibility in
selecting a forum would be part and parcel of promoting arbitration as a
viable and accommodating method of dispute resolution. The Court stated
that parties often select a forum because of its convenience, that is, one of the
parties resides there or the contract dispute originated there.36 It also stated
that "parties may be willing to arbitrate in an inconvenient forum... for the
convenience of the arbitrators, or to get a panel with special knowledge or
state [courts] have declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were 'contrary
to public policy,' or that their effect was to 'oust the jurisdiction' of the court." 407 U.S. at
9. However, the Court went on to say that "[a]lthough this view apparently still has
considerable acceptance, other courts are tending to adopt a more hospitable attitude
toward forum-selection clauses." Id. at 9-10.
31 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1337.
32Id.
33 Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
34 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1337. The Court commented that if the confirmation
provision was intended to be interpreted separately from a vacation or modification
provision, then a "proceeding to confirm the award begun in a forum previously selected
by agreement of the parties (but outside the district of the arbitration) would need to be
held in abeyance if the responding party objected." Id. Then, "[t]he objecting party would
... have to return to the district of the arbitration to begin a separate proceeding to
modify or vacate the arbitration award, and if the award withstood attack, the parties
would move back to the previously selected forum for the confirming order originally
sought." ld. The Court stated that such a situation would be absurd and inconvenient for
the parties involved. Id.
35 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
36 Cortez,' 120 S.Ct. at 1337.
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experience, or as part of some compromise .... -37 Although parties may be
willing to pick an inconvenient forum for the arbitration, they "might well be
less willing to pick such a location if any future court proceedings had to be
held there." 38 Thus, providing the parties with the ability to weigh their
options in selecting a satisfactory jurisdiction would support the FAA's
policy favoring arbitration.
A restrictive interpretation of the venue provisions would also conflict
with the FAA's provision covering motions to stay.39 The provision allows
parties to stay the trial pursuant to their agreement.4 0 Therefore, a restrictive
reading of §§ 9-11 would suggest that if an arbitration occurred "outside the
district of that litigation, [then] a subsequent proceeding to confirm, modify,
or set aside the arbitration award could not be brought in the district of the
original litigation (unless that also happened to be the chosen venue in a
forum selection agreement)." 41 Such reasoning, the Court stated, would
conflict with a prior holding permitting a court that had the initial power to
stay a proceeding under § 3 to maintain the power in subsequent proceedings
to confirm arbitration awards.42 Nonetheless, the Court Vvas careful in noting
that this alone was not dispositive.43
Lastly, the Court stated that a restrictive interpretation would also create
incompatible results for arbitration in the international arena. The FAA's
sections 204, 207, and 302 "provide for liberal choice of venue for actions to
confirm awards subject to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1975 Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration."44 Therefore, a
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. 2000). The provision is as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement,




41 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1337-38.
42 Id. at 1338 (citing Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 275-76
(1932)).
43 See id.
44 Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 204, 207, 302 (1999).
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restrictive interpretation of §§ 9-11 would effectively hinder American
courts from confirming, vacating, or modifying "foreign arbitrations not
covered by either convention." 45 The Court was disinclined to create such
"venue gaps." 46
As a result, the Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case
for further proceedings based on their finding that the FAA's provisions
governing motions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards are
intended to be permissive.47
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's granting of certiorari to review the Cortez case
may, on the one hand, have come as a surprise particularly after the refusal to
grant certiorari in four federal circuit cases involving labor and employment
arbitration.48 On the other hand, though, the case presented an issue of
significant conflict among the circuits49 and arguably defied the purpose and
policy of the FAA, to efficiently resolve conflicts through the use of
arbitration.50
45 Cortez, 120 S.Ct. at 1338.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1339.
4 8 Perhaps, the denial of certiorari indicates that the Court "believes that arbitration
law has stabilized and ... is now the responsibility of the lower federal courts to resolve
emerging issues and conflicts." Denials of Certiorari, 11 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION
REP. 3, 3 (2000). The four federal cases that were denied certiorari were the following
listed in Denials of Certiorari: Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, 157 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement can take any FLSA claim to court even though the
claims are also covered by a grievance-arbitration procedure), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 39
(1999); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that Title VII does not "preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements"), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 44 (1999); Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
351 v. Cooper Natural Res., Inc., 163 F.3d 916, 919-20 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
"last chance agreement will in most cases supersede the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, and should be viewed as such by an arbitrator"), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 45
(1999); Local Union 1393 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Utilities Dist. of W. Ind. Rural
Elec. Membership Coop., 167 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an
employer who retains an exclusive right to discharge an employee is not subject to
arbitration of the discharge, even though the collective bargaining agreement includes a
broad arbitration clause), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 61 (1999). Id.
49 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50 See Denials of Certiorari, supra note 48, at 3.
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A majority of the circuits found the FAA's venue provisions to be
permissive. 51 The Tenth Circuit in P & P Industries, Inc. v. Sutter Corp. 52
was the most recent circuit to address the interpretation of the venue
provisions. Similar to the circumstances in Cortez, P & P Industries, Inc. ("P
& P") filed a motion in the Oklahoma district court to vacate an arbitration
award granted in favor of Sutter.53 About one week later, Sutter moved to
confirm the arbitration award in Texas, where the award was rendered. 54
After first addressing the jurisdictional issues in Texas, the motions were
eventually transferred to Oklahoma. 55 p & P appealed to the Tenth Circuit
after the Oklahoma district court confirmed the award in favor of Sutter
stating that the "FAA allowed any federal district court, not just the one in
the district where the award was rendered, to confirm the award. ' 56
Like the Supreme Court in Cortez, the Tenth Circuit cited to In re VMS
Securities Litigation,57 the leading authority of a permissive reading of the
statute. It found that an examination of statutory construction, Congressional
intent, and logic would avoid the "absurd results" 58 that may occur if a
restrictive reading were adopted. Further, the court pointed out that "none of
the minority opinions contain any detailed analysis of the issue," that is
nothing more than a list of cites of "ostensibly applicable precedent." 59
51 See supra note 4 discussing the cases that held the FAA venue provisions were
permissive.
52 p & P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d 861 (10th Cir. 1999).




57 In re VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 1994).
58 P & P Indus., Inc., 179 F.3d at 868-69 (citing In re VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F.3d 139,
144 (7th Cir. 1994); Sutter Corp. v. P & P Indus., Inc., 125 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir.
1997)). The court stated that a restrictive interpretation would render section 3 (stay of
proceedings) of the FAA "meaningless," and wastefully and inefficiently allocate judicial
resources. Id. at 869. Moreover, Congressional intent would indicate that "when
Congress intends for one specific district court to be the exclusive forum for a certain
matter, it uses unambiguous language to express its intentions." Id.
59 Id. at 869-70. The court pointed out that the "Eleventh Circuit stated simply that
it was bound'by a pre-split Fifth Circuit case-Naples v. Prepakt Concrete Co., 490 F.2d
182, 184 (5th Cir. 1974)-which the modem Fifth Circuit, in Sutter, found inapplicable."
Id. at 870. Further, the court stated that the "Ninth Circuit in Sunshine Beauty Supplies,
Inc. [v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California, 872 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1989),
the leading authority interpreting the venue provisions restrictively,] and Central Valley
Typographical Union, No. 46 v. McClatchy Newspapers, 762 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir.
1985), considered itself bound by circuit precedent, but that circuit precedent-United
416
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Cortez adopted much of the analysis used in the circuit courts to support
a permissive reading of the venue provisions. In particular, though, the
Supreme Court focused on upholding the policy behind the FAA. Although
two district courts have declined to extend Cortez, neither case severely
threatens the ruling. In In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation60 the court agreed
with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cortez but chose to follow the state
law in interpreting the venue provisions of the Clayton Act restrictively. 61
The second case that declined to extend Cortez was In re RealNetworks,
Inc., Privacy Litigation.62 The In re RealNetworks court did not extend
beyond the Cortez Court's comment that the FAA venue provisions are more
appropriately analyzed at the time of their enactment, 63 in determining that in
States ex rel. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ets-Hokin Corp., 397 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.
1968)-contains no analysis of the issue, and merely states its conclusion." Id. The
court's last example pointed out that the "Sixth Circuit relie[d] solely on Prepakt
Concrete Co., Ets-Hokin Corp., and Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541
F.2d 1263, 1272 n. 16 (7th Cir. 1976), a case the Seventh Circuit ignored as 'dicta' on this
point in In re VMS Sec. Litig., 21 F.3d at 143." Id.
60 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2000).
61 See id. at 31. The plaintiffs brought an antitrust suit against various vitamin
suppliers claiming that they conspired to "fix prices and allocate market shares of
vitamins, vitamin premixes, and other bulk vitamin products." Id. at 28. Three of the
alien defendants moved for a motion to dismiss based on the lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants should be subject to jurisdiction because it
is in accordance with the principle that special venue provisions should "supplement,
rather than preempt, general venue statutes." Id. at 30 (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai
Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989)). The court rejected the interpretation
stating that while they agree with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cortez regarding the
venue provisions of the FAA, they must "follow the current state of the law in this Circuit
with regard to the venue provision ... of the Clayton Act [because] [t]he two statutes are
simply not identical and thus could conceivably be treated differently." 1d. at 31. As a
result, the court held that the defendants can only be sued in the jurisdiction where they
"reside, are found or transact business." Id. (citing GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v.
BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C.C. 2000)).
62 No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000). In this case, the
plaintiffs brought a class action suit against RealNetworks alleging that "RealNetworks'
software products secretly allowed RealNetworks to access and intercept users' electronic
communications and stored information without their knowledge or consent." Id. at *1.
The court had granted the defendant's motion to stay the litigation and enforce the
agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Id. The plaintiffs contested requesting that additional
arguments in opposition to an arbitration be heard and the ruling be reconsidered. Id. In
particular, they argued that the agreement to arbitrate in Washington was invalid because
the License Agreement containing the arbitration clause did not constitute a "writing"
within the meaning of the FAA or the Washington Arbitration Act. Id. at *2.
63 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
this case the word "written" was meant to include electronic
communications. 64 The plain meaning of "written" neither appears to
exclude electronic communications, 65 nor suggests that Congress cannot
include new words to "fortify the current rule with a more precise text that
curtails uncertainty" because they excluded it from the statute at the time of
its enactment. 66
Although In re Vitamins and In re RealNetworks decline to extend
Cortez, they fail to sufficiently challenge the main principle that motions to
confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards can occur in any jurisdiction
proper under the general venue statute or in the jurisdiction where the award
was rendered. Therefore, parties should have little, if any, trouble instituting
an action to enforce their arbitration awards in a jurisdiction proper under the
FAA provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Cortez holding allows parties in an arbitration to have a broader
range of forums to consider when seeking to enforce the award rendered. The
Court clearly established that as long as parties are able to show that the
place they seek to confirm, vacate, or modify the arbitration award is proper
under the general venue statute or proper as the place where the award was
issued, courts will have jurisdiction over the motion. Cortez stays true to the
policy that the FAA's provisions are intended to be liberally construed in
favor of arbitration. Further, the Court seemed to give thorough consideration
to the practical effects of their holding on parties' desires to include
arbitration clauses and award enforcement provisions in contracts, on court
dockets, on other statutory venue provisions and on other areas of law where
arbitration is used to settle disputes.
Although Cortez addressed the venue question in the context of
construction contracts, the holding is meant to encompass all contracts falling
under the FAA. Therefore, forum selection agreements to confirm awards in
a jurisdiction that in the future happens to be a different site from where the
arbitration occurs will still be able to proceed with their motion without
difficulty. This holding strengthens the parties' rights to resolve and enforce
their claims. Moreover, it promotes the policy behind the FAA to effectively
and efficiently resolve disputes through arbitration.
Karyn A. Doi
64 Id. at *3-*4.
65 Id. at *3.
66 Id. at *4 (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiderberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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